Financial Instability, Uncertainty and Banks’ Lending Behaviour by Swamy, Vighneswara & S, Sreejesh
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial Instability, Uncertainty and
Banks’ Lending Behaviour
Vighneswara Swamy and Sreejesh S
IBS - Hyderabad, IBS - Hyderabad
2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47518/
MPRA Paper No. 47518, posted 12. June 2013 05:24 UTC
Page 1 of 16 
 
Financial Instability, Uncertainty and Banks’ Lending Behaviour 
 
Vighneswara Swamy   Ph.D 
IBS – Hyderabad  
 
 
Abstract 
Why do banks squeeze their lending activity? is an oft-repeated 
question during the times of financial crisis. This study examines an emerging 
economy’s banking system and contributes to the evolving body of literature 
on the topic by providing answers as to what causes the sluggish bank credit 
during the times of recession. By employing cointegration technique, the study 
shows that bank credit has a significant positive relationship with the 
borrowing activity of the banks and on the contrary, inverse relationship with 
investment activity during the financial crisis. Accordingly, we suggest that 
banks could increase their lending by increasing the borrowings rapidly either 
from the Central Banks or from Government supported long term lending 
institutions during recessionary periods.  
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Financial Instability, Uncertainty and Banks’ Lending Behaviour 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis, also termed as ‘the great recession’ which resulted 
into a grave banking panic and threw most of the economies of the world into severe 
recession, is mostly attributed to several factors, few of which are associated with the housing 
and credit markets. Insinuated causes consist of, the insolvency of homeowners to meet their 
mounting mortgage payments, unusually high levels of personal and corporate debt levels, 
foolhardy financial product innovation, the collapse of vital financial institutions and awful 
errors of judgment by credit rating agencies in the rating of structured products. 
Macroeconomic aspects, for instance, monetary policy, excessive liberalisation, global trade 
imbalances, and ineffective government regulation are deemed to have played a direct or 
indirect role in the crisis. Without refuting the impairing effects of the above causes, we 
believe that the origins of the global financial crisis lie in the rational profit-seeking 
behaviour of banks. Indeed, we consider that the rational profit-seeking behaviour of banks in 
the course of economic expansion is the vital cause behind the pro-cyclical financial infirmity 
of the economic system and its heightened sensitivity to a financial shock. 
 
The global financial crisis has spread across the world through a range of financial as 
well as real economy channels. Cross-border bank lending has also been one of the major 
financial channels through which stresses in the global financial system were spread to other 
emerging economies. While for some economies like European economies, the transmission 
conduit for the losses on account of toxic assets was obvious and thereby increased the 
fragility of banks’ balance sheets. However, for some Asian economies like that of India, the 
story was a bit different as the exposure of their domestic banks was limited to such 
international toxic assets. Yet these economies did experience a substantial slow down.  
 
The connexion of a recession and a banking crisis is intensely problematic and the 
consequent fall in bank lending has key implications. However, the sag in credit supply puts 
upward pressure on interest rate spreads, and thereby leads to an inordinate fall in lending 
than one might see in a typical recession. What makes the banks squeeze their lending 
activity during the crisis? It is an oft-repeated question, which deserves re-examination to 
find the suitable reasons from diverse banking systems across the globe. The available 
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literature, though throws up some interesting insights, we attempt to find some more answers 
from a rather relatively conservative banking system like that of an emerging economy in 
India. Indian banking like much of Asian Banking is characterized by sizeable proportion of 
ownership under government control and is distinct from the free marketeers led Anglo-
Saxon model. 
  
Our paper is one among the relatively small family of works that underline the 
relationship between bank behaviour and financial instability and also analyse how the 
financial crisis passed through the banks’ lending behaviour. Our endeavor in this study is to 
understand the impact of financial uncertainty and instability on banks’ behaviour more 
specifically the effect of the crisis on the lending behaviour of the banks. We begin by 
presenting in Section 2, the theoretical framework illustrating the recent approaches on 
financial instability placing the banking system at the epicenter of analysis. We analyse more 
specifically how financial instability affects the banks’ lending behaviour during the times of 
economic shocks or crisis. The methodology involving the data and its sources and research 
design explaining the empirical framework and estimation is expounded in Section 3. The 
results of the analyses with discussion on the findings are enunciated in Section 4 and the 
conclusion and policy implications are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND BANKS’ LENDING BEHAVIOUR 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Global financial system from 2001 to 2007 saw an extraordinarily high economic 
growth with abundant liquidity. It is established empirically that the origins of the global 
financial crisis can be traced to the low interest rate policies adopted by the Federal Reserve 
and other central banks after the burst of the dot com bubble. An exhaustive summary of the 
events preceding and accompanying the global financial crisis is offered in Allen and Carletti 
(2010), Brunnermeir (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Taylor (2008). The sudden outbreak 
of financial crisis in September 2008 affected banks across the globe with uncertainty and 
resultant instability in the markets. Banks have reacted to the crisis by reducing their lending 
exposure (Ivanshina and Scharfstein, 2008). However, on the contrary, banks would be 
hesitant to cut their lending too drastically in view of their enduring relationships with the 
borrowers and if such relationships terminated would prove to be too costly in furthering their 
business in future (Rajan, 1992; Ongena, 1999). Further, Ralph de Haas & Neeltje van Horen 
(2009) in their study have found that during a financial crisis arranging banks retain large 
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portions of loans and forge more concentrated syndicates, signifying an heightened need to 
screen and monitor borrowers.  
 
Few economists building their analysis on a variety of analytical tools and hypotheses 
have scrutinized the association between bank behaviour and financial uncertainty. One 
school of thought emphasizes the crucial role of uncertainty and confidence in the emergence 
of an endogenous mechanism of financial instability impelled by the dynamics of asset prices 
and banking behaviour. The most archetypal and leading work adopting this approach was 
the “financial instability hypothesis” of Hyman P. Minsky which, basing on the financial 
concept of economic fluctuations states that economy’s inherent tendency to transform itself 
into an unstable financially fragile system which is dependent on the naive interplay of the 
profit-seeking behaviour of economic agents. In the Minskyan model of financial instability, 
the profit–seeking behaviour of banks in an uncertain decision-making environment leads 
them to such financial practices that stem out to a situation of escalating financial fragility. 
 
Of late, macroeconomic models grounded on asymmetric information also single out 
the role played by banks at the core of the assessment of financial instability and contend that 
the crux of financial crises is in the vulnerabilities of the banking sector. Mishkin (1999a and 
1999b) argues that increase in information asymmetry spawns ex ante a cumulative risk of 
adverse selection and produces ex-post a proliferation in moral hazard, which is coped by 
limiting credit by the financial intermediaries. As asymmetries of information are ubiquitous 
in financial markets, any crisis that escalates the asymmetries of information like; impairing 
of banking or non-banking intermediaries’ balance sheets, escalating interest rates, fall in 
asset prices and compounding uncertainty cause in a curtailment of credit. Another school of 
thought emphasizes that the balance-sheet exposures (Allen et al., 2002) like; maturity 
mismatches, currency mismatches, capital structure problems and solvency issues could 
contribute to a currency and banking crisis.  
 
An empirical study by Calomiris and Wilson (2004) looked into the causal link from 
the escalating credit risk by way of decreased bank funding to lower credit supply. Demirgüç-
Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) notice a similar kind of evidence for an extensive 
country sample. Besides limiting the risk of their asset portfolio, the authors observe that, 
banks quite often build up their capital buffer to insulate depositors from credit risk. Because 
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of such ‘deleveraging’, bank lending tends to moderate considerably during the times of 
financial crises (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). 
 
2.2 Financial Soundness  
One of the important sources of vulnerability that can lead to a financial crisis can be 
the weakness (such as a high level of short-term debt) in the financial structure of the 
economy i.e., the composition and the size of the assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. A 
financial crisis follows when the demand for financial assets of one or more sectors plummets 
and consequently the banking system fails to meet the outflows or may be unable to attract 
new financing or roll over existing short-term liabilities. In this direction, financial soundness 
(Table-1) matters much during the financial crisis because it gives some indication of how 
likely it is that financial problems would be transmitted into the real economy (by, for 
example) a reduction in the supply of loans. 
 
2.3 Trends in Bank Credit 
Bank credit has shown a robust upward trend in most emerging economies until 
around 2007. One of the focal issues is the extent to which there was a decline in credit 
growth during the recession period and how it affected credit supply or demand. A decline in 
credit supply would imply that the impact of the crisis on the financial sector has swelled the 
effects of the very large cyclical downturn. On the contrary, if demand effects were cogent, 
this would indicate that efforts to supply financing and support the operation of the financial 
sector have been successful in boosting credit supply and mitigating the adverse effects of the 
crisis in developed financial markets. Growth in domestic credit in select economies 
particularly during the crisis period has nosedived in almost all the economies though the 
extent may vary (Figure-1). However, it is interesting that the experiences of BRICS 
countries are quite different form that of other developed countries in view of the nature of 
their economies.    
 
It is but natural to have our curiosity to understand the lending behaviour of the banks 
in such emerging economies, which showed some sense of resilience to financial crisis in 
view of their strong domestic demand, led growth. We examine the trend of bank credit in 
India, which is representative of a rather domestic focused banking sector when compared to 
other developed markets. The trend of bank credit in India even during the crisis period has 
experienced an upward trajectory despite huge constraining factors (Figure-2).    
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Banking sector being an integral part of the economy in ensuring the efficient transmission of 
the funds, it has a close relationship with the other macro-economic factors that play a vital 
part in the economic development. Despite the downward movement of some of the 
economic indicators like the imports and exports, the bank credit has continued to show 
rising trend in view of the strong domestic demand led growth.  
 
Further, the core financial selector indicators for India like; Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR), Capital Adequacy Ratio–Tier-1, Gross Non-Performing Assets (GNPAs) to total 
loans, Net Non-Performing Assets (NNPAs) to total loans and Return on Equity (ROE) have 
experienced downward pressure during the recession period (Figure-4). On the contrary, 
liquid assets to total assets ratio has moved upwards indicating the tendency of the banks to 
hold cash during the times of recession instead of investing in loans or investment products. 
Interest Rates (Benchmark prime lending rate), Money market rate and the discount rates) 
which have significant impact on the lending activity showed downward movement in the 
Indian banking scenario (Figure-5).  
 
Of course, banks claim that sluggish bank lending was due to a fall in demand but 
they have tightened the terms of credit on which borrowers can access funds. However, given 
the backdrop of the above discussed understanding of the behaviour of the banking sector 
during the recession period we try to find answer for our specific question, how was the 
lending behaviour of the banks during the recession and which was the strongly correlated 
determinant for bank credit. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION 
We use data on bank behaviour in India to provide fresh insights into how banks 
respond to financial crises especially in the area of credit supply. The framework of our 
empirical analysis is based on a robust database and well-established techniques. 
 
3.1 Data and the Key Variables 
The weekly data on Commercial Banks in India for the study period has been sourced 
from the robust database of Reserve Bank of India (various issues of Statistical Tables 
Relating to Banks in India and Report of Trend and Progress of Banking in India). The 
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choice of the period is made in line with the need of the study to compare and analyse the 
impact of financial crisis on the bank lending activity. Accordingly, we have set three distinct 
comparable time horizons keeping in mind the availability of the weekly data. Phase-1 covers 
the period from Dec 2006 to July 2008 to represent the pre-recession (boom/normal) period, 
Phase-2 covers the period from August 2008 to March 2010 to represent the recession period 
and finally the Phase-3 includes the period from April 2010 to March 2011 to capture the 
recovery period. Further, the variables used for the analysis include important determinants of 
bank behaviour and are detailed in Table-2. 
Table-2: Definitions for Key Variables 
Variable Description 
Bank Credit LnBC 
Logarithm of Bank Credit (total of outstanding credit 
for all the scheduled commercial banks in India)  
Aggregate 
Deposits 
LnAD 
Logarithm of Aggregate Deposits (total of outstanding 
aggregate deposits held by all the scheduled 
commercial banks in India) 
Investments LnINVEST 
Logarithm of Investments (total of outstanding 
investments by all the scheduled commercial banks in 
India) 
Money at Call 
and Short Notice 
LnMATCAL 
Logarithm of Money at Call and Short Notice (total of 
all Money at Call and Short Notice held by all the 
scheduled commercial banks in India) 
Borrowings LnBORROW 
Logarithm of Borrowings (total of all outstanding 
Borrowings by all the scheduled commercial banks in 
India) 
Bank Nifty LnBNIFTY 
Logarithm of Bank Nifty index of NSE which is 
considered to be most representative index for 
understanding the market performance of banks in India 
Lending Rates LnBPLR 
Logarithm of BPLR (Benchmark Prime Lending Rates) 
rates which represent the average levels of bank lending 
rates in India 
Cash-Deposit 
Ratio 
CashDR 
Ratio of Cash held by banks to their Aggregate 
Deposits   
Investment-
Deposit Ratio 
IDR 
Ratio of outstanding Investments to Aggregated 
Deposits of banks  
Credit-Deposit 
Ratio 
CDR 
Ratio of Outstanding Credit to Aggregate Deposit levels 
of banks 
 
Credit to Deposit Ratio (CDR) is one of the indicators that is used to measure / reflect the 
bank/s’ efficiency in credit delivery. A careful look at its trend gives a broader trend of the 
banks’ credit supply activity. Though this ratio involves the outstanding levels, it captures the 
inclusive picture of the credit delivery activity. Figure-6 captures the volatile movement of 
CDR during the study period. During the recession period, the CDR has experienced an 
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uncertain downward tumble and has found an upward pitch during the subsequent recovery 
period.  
 
We look at the trend of Investment to Deposit Ratio (IDR) during the study period. Figure-7 
presents the interesting movement of IDR wherein we notice that the movement is almost 
opposite to that of CDR during the recesssion period which indicates that banks were hesitant 
towards credit delivery and turned towards safe investment of their avaailable funds instead 
of the riskier lending activity. 
 
We take a look at the liquidity management of the banks during the study period and find that 
Cash to Deposit Ratio which indicates the cash holding levels of the banks was sliding down 
during the recession period (Figure-8). This denotes the tight funds mangement scenario 
during the recession period due to the impact of the crisis.  
 
3.2 The Model 
Bank Credit has direct relationship with the predictor variables such as Aggregate 
Deposits, Borrowings, Investments, Money at Call and Short Notice, Bank Nifty and Lending 
Rates. Accordingly, we frame the following quadratic equation. 
 
Yt = α + β1X1t + …………… + βnXnt + µ                     
 
Accordingly, Bank Credit can be better explained and estimated with the following version of 
equation. 
 
BC = ƒ [AD, INVEST, MATCAL, BORROW, BNIFTY, BPLR] + µ   
 
Due to potential nonlinearities, the natural logarithms of the regressors are considered 
accordingly, when we log-transform this model we obtain: 
 
LnBC = α + LnAD + LnINVEST + LnMATCAL + LnBORROW + LnBNIFTY +   
  +LnBPLR + µ  
           
We expect the borrowings to have a close positive relationship with the bank credit 
during the recession in view of the tight liquidity and decreasing deposits mobilization 
2 
3 
1 
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scenario. Further, we also predict that as the banks are guided by their profit seeking 
behaviour they tend to curtail their lending activity and try to invest their funds in the assured 
investments instead of venturing into the risky activity of lending. 
 
3.3 Methodology  
Given that we are dealing with time series data, the possibility of non-stationarity of 
the variables cannot be ruled out. We perform stationarity test on the variables that are 
included in our analysis to ensure that the results from the analysis are not spurious. For this 
purpose, Augmented Dickey Fuller (hereafter, ADF) test and Phillips and Perron (hereafter, 
PP) (1988) tests are conducted to know the stationarity of the variables.  
 
  
( ) 
 
  
) 
 
Further, 
   
 (Yt  is a  random walk  with a drift with linear time trend  if γ=0 
 
The ADF test mentioned above assumes that the errors are statistically independent and have 
a constant variance. In case of PP test, the assumption is relaxed, allows the error 
disturbances to be weakly dependent, and heterogeneously distributed.  
This can be written as: 
   
 
In both the tests the null hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary (possess a unit root) 
and if the calculated value exceeds the critical value (based on Mackinnon, 1996 for ADF and 
PP test), the null hypothesis may be rejected implying the stationary characteristics of the 
data series. The ADF test is a parametric auto regression to ARIMA structure of the errors in 
the test regression, but the PP test corrects for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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errors. In ADF test, Schwarz Information criteria (SIC) have been used to select the 
appropriate lag length, whereas in PP test we have used the Newey-West using Bartlet kernel 
method.  
 
We use a Cointegration framework to identify systematic interaction effects between 
the identified determinants of lending behaviour of banks. Accordingly, Johansen's 
Cointegration technique was employed to verify the existence of cointegration between the 
determinants of bank credit and other determinants as mentioned above. Once the order of 
integration of each variable is determined in three periods, the concept of Cointegration by 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) method (hereafter JJ method)
1
 is used to examine the existence 
of cointegrating relationship between the determinants. This method is considered to be more 
robust than the Engel Granger procedure (based the residual). Therefore, we prefer the JJ 
method, which uses the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model to test the number of 
cointegrating vectors, and the estimation is based on Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. 
Following Johansen (1988), Johansen, and Juselius (1990) VAR representation of column 
vector Xt can be written as follows: 
tit
k
i
itt XBzX  

 )(
1
)(
 
Where Xt is column vector of n endogenous variables, z is a (n×1) vector of deterministic 
variables, ε is a (n × 1) vector of white noise error terms, and Πi is a (n×n) matrix of 
coefficients. Since, most of the macroeconomic time series variables are non-stationary, VAR 
of such models are generally estimated in first-difference forms.  
 
JJ test provides two Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics for cointegration analysis, the 
trace (λtrace) statistics, and the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) statistics. The trace statistics tests 
the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating relations is r against k cointegration 
relations, where k is the number of endogenous variables. The maximum eigenvalue test, 
tests the null hypothesis that there are r-cointegrating vectors against an alternative of r+1 
cointegrating vectors. To determine the rank of matrix Π, the test values obtained from the 
two test statistics are compared with the critical value from Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis 
(1999). For both tests if the test statistic value is greater than the critical value, the null 
                                                          
1
 See Philips(1991),Cheung and Lai(1993) and Gonzala (1994) 
8 
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hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors is rejected in favor of the corresponding alternative 
hypothesis. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the correlations statistics of the determinants employed in 
the analysis for the pre-recession period, recession period and recovery period. During the 
Pre-Recession period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD (0.983), LnINVEST 
(0.946), LnBORROW (0.811), LnBPLR (0.433) at 0.01% level of significance (Table-3). 
During the Recession period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD (0.964), 
LnINVEST (0.916), LnBNIFTY (0.698) at 0.01% level of significance and has negative 
correlation with; LnMATCAL (-0.659) and LnBPLR (-0.797) at 0.01% level of significance 
(Table-4). During the Recovery period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD 
(0.518), LnINVEST (0.728), LnBPLR (0.422), LnBNIFTY (0.426) at 0.01% level of 
significance and has negative correlation (Table-5).  
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF 1979) Phillip Perron (PP 
1988) unit-root test results. In both the tests, the null hypothesis is that the series is non-
stationary (possess a unit root) and if the calculated value exceeds the critical value (based on 
Mackinnon, 1996 for ADF and PP test), the null hypothesis may be rejected implying the 
stationary characteristics of the data series. The results revealed that all the level (first-
differenced) variables are insignificant (significant) at the 1 percent level, indicating that all 
the variables during these three periods are integrated at the first degree and satisfied the 
condition for the cointegration test. Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
developed this methodology (cointegration) for assessing long-run relationships. The 
methodology applies maximum likelihood procedure to determine the presence of 
cointegrating vectors in a set of non-stationary time series.  
 
As the number of lag orders selected can affect the number of cointegration, the 
appropriate lags are carefully selected with a number of multivariate diagnostic tests. The 
appropriate  lag orders can be selected from five information criteria (i.e., the likelihood ratio, 
the Final Prediction Error (FPE), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC), and the Hannan Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC)) are first 
determined. For doing cointegration, the study selected lag interval of one (for all three 
models) as suggested by Schwarz Information criteria (SIC). In this study, both trace and 
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maximum eigenvalue statistics are considered in determining the number of cointegration 
vectors. In particular, if two test statistics show the same number of cointegration, that 
number is used. If two statistics do not show the same number of cointegration, the number is 
selected using trace test. Luintel and Khan (1999) have shown that trace test is more robust 
than maximum eigen value criteria in testing the cointegration. 
 
Having confirmed that integration of the seven series is of the same order (checked 
for three periods); we test whether the seven series are cointegrated over the sample period. 
Table 9, 10 and 11 show the results of the Johansen test. Since the Johansen test is based on 
vector auto regressive model (VAR), we select one period lag for the model based on SIC. 
Starting with the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables, trace statistics is 
220.6801, which is well above the 5% critical value. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration among these variables at 5% and accept that there is one co-integrating 
equation. Considering the null hypothesis of at most one co-integrating relation, based on the 
trace statistics of 131.3113, which is greater than 5% critical value of 83.93712 we reject the 
null hypothesis of at most one co-integrating equation at 5% significance level. Similar is the 
case with the second and third cointegration relationship, where we find trace statistics is 
greater than the critical value thus we reject the null hypothesis and infer that there are more 
than three cointegrating relationship between variables. The result from Maximum Eigen 
Statistics table also supports that there is more than three cointegrating relationship. In 
addition, we find that Maximum Eigen value is greater than the critical value and hence we 
reject the null hypothesis of at most three cointegration vectors at 5% level of significance. 
Hence based on trace test we may conclude that there are more than three co-integrating 
equation among these variables during pre-recession. 
 
In the similar vein, table-10 shows the cointegrating relationship between the study 
variables during recession. In this case, both statistics (trace and maximum eigenvalue) are 
showing similar results. The trace statistics of 60.93088, which is greater than the critical 
value (54.07904) at 5 % level of significance (see at most two). Therefore, we are rejecting 
the null hypothesis that there are at most two cointegrating vectors and may accept the 
alternative hypothesis of more than two cointegrating relationship among variables.  
 
Cointegrating relationship among study variables during recovery period is shown in 
the Table-11. From the results, it found that there is more than one cointegrating relationship 
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(based on trace test). In case of trace test, the statistic is greater than the critical value at 5 % 
level of significance and rejecting the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating 
relationship. However, in case of maximum eigen value criteria it found that there is one co-
integrating relationship. However, based on Luintel and Khan (1999) suggestion the study 
preferred trace test and inferred that there is more than one cointegrating relationship among 
study variables during recovery period.  
The normalized cointegration coefficients for the three models are presented in Table-
12. The signs of the coefficients like LnBORROW and LnBNIFTY were found to be 
negative and others are positive during pre-recession (see first column-Table 12). The results 
show that all the variables are significant. We thus infer that bank credit increases with 
increase in LnAD, LnINVEST, LnMATCAL and LnBPLR and decreases with an increase in 
LnBORROW and LnBNIFTY during pre-recession period.  
 
During recession (see Table-12, column 2), the results show that except LnMATCAL 
all other variables are significant. For LnAD the coefficient is 2.61, signifying that its 1 % 
increase during recession led to more than 2.6 % increase in bank credit. In the same way the 
coefficients for LnBORROW, LnINVEST, LnBNIFTY are 1.17, -2.27(inverse relationship), 
0.33 and -2.08(inverse relationship) respectively. 
 
During recovery period (see Table-12 column 3), the variables (LnAD, LnBORROW, 
and LnBNIFTY) were found to be positively significant indicating that the increase in these 
variables led to a positive significant increase in bank credit during recovery period. The 
results showed that during this period, LnMATCAL, LnINVEST, and LnBPLR had an 
inverse or negative relationship with bank credit, explaining the decrease in these factors. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes uniquely to the evolving body of literature on bank’s lending 
behaviour during the times of financial instability and uncertainty which mostly prevails 
during the times of financial crises by providing answers to the oft-repeated question “What 
makes the banks squeeze their lending activity during the crisis?’. Broadly, our results are in 
agreement with the stylized facts on bank behaviour in the recent financial crisis, especially 
on reduced bank lending, increased competition for retail deposits, and reduced monetary 
policy effectiveness. 
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We have found that, during the times of recession, particularly in the emerging 
markets like that of India, borrowings by banks have a significant positive relationship on the 
lending behaviour of the banks. This is because of the fact that banks are unable to garner the 
much needed financial resources for lending through deposits in view of the prevailing 
factors of uncertainty and instability (during recession) which makes the depositors to 
withhold their deposit making activity and instead look for other real asset investments or to 
hold cash till the appearance of the signs of financial stability in the markets.  
 
Our study has also established that lending rates even though were downward during 
the recession period were not having positively significant relationship with banks’ lending 
which elucidates that the lending rates were required to be reduced drastically in order to 
infuse bank lending. Further, the results of our study indicate that investment activity of the 
banks had a negatively significant relationship with bank lending. This is because of the 
reason that during the times of financial instability the banks tend to tighten their lending 
activity by stringent screening and rigorous monitoring of their borrowers and thereby 
increase their investments to ensure safe returns (profit-seeking behaviour and also due to the 
fall in the state of confidence of banks and the nature of firm decision structures). This can be 
discerned from the fact that while Credit to Deposit Ratio showed a downward trend, 
Investment to Deposit Ratio showed an upward trend during the recession evidencing the 
shortened lending activity of the banks. Further, we also notice decreasing Cash to Deposit 
Ratio during recession period which indicates the tight liquidity scenario in view of the 
financial instability and uncertainty. We opine that failure to curb this trend of sharp decline 
in bank lending further results in banking crisis (Gentler 2010). Accordingly, we suggest that 
the bank’s lending could be maintained in the relatively same pace during the times of 
recession too by increasing the borrowings rapidly either from the Central Banks or from 
Government supported long term lending institutions. Besides, this measure would also 
enable the banks to tide over the liquidity crisis resulted out of the financial crisis.  
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